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STATE OF UTAH
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JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

May 1 3 , 1993

Mary T. Noonan, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

State v. Steven Michael Stilling
Court of Appeals No. 920186-CA
Argued January 20, 19 9 3
(Judges Russon, Jackson, and Greenwood)

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I wish to direct the Court's attention to a recent
decision of the Utah Supreme Court regarding motions to withdraw
guilty pleas. The case is Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison,
No. 910533, filed May 5, 1993.
It applies to the following
arguments in the State's Brief of Appellee in this case:
At pages 25-26 of the State's brief, see Salazar, slip
op. at 6-7 (supreme court's adoption of Rule 11 "strict compliance"
requirement, while based on constitutional concerns, "did not
purport to establish constitutional requirements." (emphasis in
original)). At pages 27-29 of the State's brief, see Salazar, slip
op. at 7 (at least when challenged via a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, constitutional validity of guilty*plea as knowing
and voluntary may be examined through evidence outside the confines
of the plea hearing record).
A copy of this letter, plus a courtesy copy of the
supreme court's slip opinion in Salazar, is being mailed to counsel
for appellant. Thank you for your attention.
Yo/ars,

mi

Jv Kevin Murphy
Assistant Attorney General
cc:

Jo Carol Nesset-Sale
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 • FAX NO.: 801-538-1121

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Ben Fidel Salazar,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 910533
F I L E D
May 5 , 1 9 9 3

v.

Warden, Utah State Prison,
Defendant and Appellee.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys:

Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., David B. Thompson,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant

DURHAM, Justice;
Plaintiff Ben Fidel Salazar pleaded guilty to first
degree murder, a capital felony, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that (1) he had been denied the effective
assistance of counsel, (2) the plea had been coerced, and (3) the
trial court had failed to comply with rule 11(5) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his plea. After an
evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition. Salazar
appeals, and we affirm.
Salazar was charged with first degree murder and
aggravated sexual assault in connection with the strangulation
death of Charlotte Montoya. The information also alleged as an
aggravating factor that Salazar previously had been convicted of
a second degree felony involving the use or threat of violence to
a person. On September 7, 1989, Salazar pleaded guilty to first
degree murder, and in exchange the prosecution dropped the charge
of aggravated sexual assault and agreed not to seek the death
penalty at sentencing.
At the plea hearing, Salazar presented an affidavit
setting forth the elements of the offense, a description of the
conduct for which he was criminally liable, the rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty, the terms of the plea bargain, and

Salazar filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus
on June 18, 1991.3 He alleged that his trial attorneys were
ineffective, that his plea was involuntary because it was entered
"with coercion and undue influence," and that the trial court had
failed to comply with rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In support of the last claim, Salazar alleged that
the court failed to adequately inquire as to his understanding of
(1) the nature and elements of the offense to which he was
pleading guilty, (2) the minimum and maximum sentences that could
be imposed, and (3) the terms of the plea agreement, as required
by rule 11(5)(d)-(f). As a result, Salazar alleged, he was
restrained "in violation [of] and contrary to the provisions of
Amendments V and VI, United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 7 and 12, Constitution of the State of Utah."
The habeas court4 held an evidentiary hearing at which
Salazar and both of his trial attorneys testified. Salazar
testified that his attorneys never discussed the elements of the
crime with him. Specifically, he testified that they never
informed him that he would be pleading to "intentionally or
knowingly" causing Ms. Montoya/s death. He stated that while he
had admitted killing Ms. Montoya, he had always maintained that
the killing was not intentional or knowing. Salazar also
testified that he never read rne affidavit; rather, he only had a
chance to "glance" at it whil*_ in the holding cell before
entering his plea. Salazar admitted that he saw the portion of
the affidavit stating that he was charged with "intentionally or
knowingly" killing Ms. Montoya, but he explained that when he
protested to one of his attorneys, she just ignored him.
One of Salazar's former trial attorneys, Frances
Palacios, testified that while she had no independent
recollection of going through the affidavit and explaining the
elements of the crime to Salazar, she would not have signed the
affidavit if she had not gone over it with him first. She also
stated that she believed he understood what he was admitting.
Salazar's other trial attorney, James Bradshaw, testified that he
specifically discussed the mens rea element of first degree
murder and that Salazar was not reluctant to admit to an
"intentional" killing as defined by statute. And while
3

Salazar had filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in
September 1990. After counsel was appointed to represent him, he
filed this petition for habeas corpus. At the hearing, the
motion to withdraw was dismissed as untimely under section
77-13-6(2)(b) of the Utah Code, which provides that such a motion
must be brought within thirty days after the date of the entry of
the plea. Salazar did not appeal from this ruling; he challenges
only the denial of the habeas petition.
4

The habeas petition was heard by the same judge who
accepted the guilty plea.
3
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A writ of habeas corpus is available only "where the
petitioner has suffered an obvious injustice or a substantial
denial of a constitutional right." Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d
315, 319 (Utah 1992). Former Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(i)(l),
which was in effect when Salazar filed his petition, allowed
relief by writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner "who asserts that
in any proceedings which resulted in his commitment there was a
substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the state of Utah, or both." Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(i)(1) (1990).7 Salazar does not claim any errors other than
the purported failure to comply with Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(5). Thus, he is entitled to relief only if the
alleged violation of rule 11 is also a violation of his
constitutional rights.
Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of a number
of important rights, including the right to a jury trial, the
right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against selfincrimination, a guilty plea is not valid unless it is knowing
and voluntary. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466
(1969). And because a guilty plea is in effect an admission not
only that the defendant did certain acts, but also that the
defendant committed a certain crime, such a plea cannot be
voluntary "unless the defendant received *real notice of the true
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally
recognized requirement of due process./M Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (quoting Smith v. O'Gradv. 312 U.S. 329,
334 (1941)); accord Marshall v. Lonberaer. 459 U.S. 422, 436
(1983) (also quoting Smith); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. Rule 11
is designed to protect these rights by ensuring that the
defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements, how
the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, the consequences of
the plea, etc. However, compliance with rule 11 is not
constitutionally required.
Utah's rule 11 is patterned after Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11. Federal courts have established that
noncompliance with the federal rule is not necessarily a
* (Footnote continued.)
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, for example,
failure to strictly comply with the rule would be grounds for
reversal. We merely hold that on collateral attack of a
conviction, the petitioner must show a constitutional violation
to obtain relief.
7

This rule was substantially amended effective September 1,
1991. Rule 65B(b)(1) now provides that relief may be available
to anyone whose "commitment resulted from a substantial denial of
rights." We need not decide whether the new language was
intended to broaden the scope of the writ to provide a remedy for
nonconstitutional violations.
5

No. 910533

State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), and State v. Maauire,
830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992), both involved direct appeals, and both
cases involved construction and application of rule 11 rather
than the Utah Constitution.
Thus, a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking
a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States
Constitution. To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner
must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of
rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not
knowing and voluntary. Further, a court considering such a claim
is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at
the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the
information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys
before entering the plea. See, e.g., Henderson, 426 U.S. at 64447 (upholding findings of trial court, made after evidentiary
hearing, that petitioner's attorney never explained elements of
crime to his client); Gaddv v. Linahan. 780 F.2d 935 (11th Cir.
1986) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine what
information petitioner received and understood concerning
elements of crime before entering his plea).
After the hearing on Salazar's claim, the court found
that the elements and facts of the crime were explained to
Salazar, JLhat he understood the possible penalties, and that he
understood the plea bargain. Salazar does not challenge these
findings, and given the evidence received at the hearing, we
cannot say that they are clearly erroneous. See Termunde v. Utah
State Prison. 789 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1990). Further, the trial
court concluded that the plea "was a voluntary and intelligent
choice by Salazar and that the same was entered knowingly and
voluntarily by Salazar." Salazar likewise does not challenge
this conclusion. Because Salazar has failed to establish that
his constitutional rights were violated, he is not entitled to
relief by habeas corpus.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 920186-CA

v.
Priority No. 3

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Steven Michael Stilling appeals the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to
three counts of robbery, second degree felonies under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Defendant identifies three issues on appeal. As set
forth more fully in the body of this brief, this appeal can be
most effectively resolved by addressing only defendant's third
issue, albeit in different fashion than he has framed it.
Accordingly, the State addresses the issues as follows:
1.

Can the Trial Court's Denial of Defendant's Plea

Withdrawal Motion be Affirmed on the Ground that the Guilty
Pleas, Entered in 1985, were Entered in Substantial Compliance
with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Under the law

applicable to this case, a trial court's denial of a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea is reversed on appeal only "if it clearly
appears that that trial judge abused his discretion."
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).

State v.

This standard applies

to the ultimate denial of defendant's plea withdrawal motion.
However, the State must first overcome the trial
court's subsidiary ruling that Rule 11 had not been substantially
obeyed when defendant's pleas were entered.

This is a question

of law, addressed without deference to that subsidiary ruling,
upon review of the record made at the time the guilty pleas were
entered.

See State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991)

(reviewing plea affidavit and colloquy, and "concludfing] that
the judge who took the plea substantially complied with Rule
11(5)"); State v. Rodriguez. 718 P.2d 395 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (reviewing record and "expiation agreement" submitted at
time of plea, and upholding plea).
2.

If Defendant's Guilty Pleas were Not Entered in

Substantial Compliance with Rule 11, was it Proper for the Trial
Court, upon Litigation of the Plea Withdrawal Motion, to Receive
Additional Evidence Bearing on the Question of Whether Defendant
Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered those Pleas?

The State agrees

with defendant that this issue is one of law, hence reviewed
without deference to the trial court.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).
3.

If Additional Evidence Bearing on the Voluntary and

Knowing Nature of the Guilty Pleas Could be Properly Admitted,
Could such Evidence Properly Include the Testimony of Counsel who
2

Represented Defendant at the Time he Entered those Pleas?

This

issue appears to be one of law, in that it involves the
interpretation of Rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence, and Rules 1.6
and 1.9, Utah Rules of Professional [Attorney] Conduct.

See

State v. Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990)
(statutory interpretations reviewed without deference); State v.
Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah App. 1991) (admissibility of
evidence is question of law).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, addresses
guilty pleas as follows:
(5) The [trial] court may refuse to accept
a plea of guilty or no contest, and may not
accept the plea until the court has found:
. . .

(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him
for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached .

3

The text of any other constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules pertinent to the resolution of this appeal will be
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant's three guilty pleas to robbery were entered
in February 1985, and sentence was imposed thereon (R. 108; T.
2/13/85 at 51; Nos. 16269 at 93, 16271 at 274, 16272 at 349).*
Five years later defendant petitioned to set aside the pleas.
The petition was amended twice before final clarification by
defendant's present counsel (R. 1-3, 49-50, 61-63).

The

clarified petition took the form of a motion to withdraw the
guilty pleas, alleging that they had not been entered in
substantial compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (R. 143-46, appendix 1 of this brief).
The trial court heard oral argument of the plea
withdrawal motion in October 1991 (T. 10/9/91).

Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law denying the motion were signed on February
7, 1992 (R. 157-60, addendum C to Br. of Appellant).

Notice of

*Record references in this brief are to the record of the plea
withdrawal motion, in a cream-colored binding (R. 1-200); to the
transcript of the entry of the plea (T. 2/13/85 at 51-61); to the
transcript of the hearing of the plea withdrawal motion (T. 10/9/91
at 1-50).
The charges to which defendant pleaded guilty are
commemorated in three red-bound volumes, identified by the last
five digits of the case numbers, 16269, 16271, and 16272; of these,
No. 16271 also contains the habitual criminal charge, Circuit Court
No. 84-335F, which was dismissed upon entry of the guilty pleas.
Such documents not already appended to defendant's brief will be
reproduced in this brief.
4

the denial was given on March 16, 1992 (R. 195-96), and this
appeal timely followed (R. 198).2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State draws its fact recitation from all the
evidence available to the parties and the trial courts at the
times of the proceedings in question.

A two-part recitation is

given, first looking at the original entry of the guilty pleas,
and then recounting the motion to withdraw the pleas.
Entry of the Guilty Pleas
Defendant was originally charged with four counts of
aggravated robbery, first degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1990), and an enhanced penalty for being a habitual
criminal, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1992), was also
sought.

At his August 1984 district court arraignment, at which

he pleaded not guilty, informations on all of these were read
verbatim to defendant (T. 8/31/84 at 95-98).
After various pre-trial proceedings not pertinent to
this appeal,3 a plea agreement was reached in February 1985,
whereby the prosecution filed amended informations charging
2

The actual notice of appeal appears in the back of case file
No. 16269, perhaps because it is mistakenly styled in part as an
appeal from that conviction.
This is, of course, actually an
appeal from the denial of the plea withdrawal motion, which had its
own case number, No. 900902323.
3

After sentencing on his guilty pleas, defendant appealed,
claiming violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in
connection with the fact that he had been apprehended in Oregon.
His convictions were affirmed, State v. Stillinas, 709 P.2d 348
(Utah 1985). Convictions upon trial for other robberies, committed
in Salt Lake County at about the same time, were also affirmed in
State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989).
5

defendant with three robberies, second degree felonies under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990), dropping the fourth robbery charge
and the habitual criminal enhancement (T. 2/13/85 at 51, 56, 60,
appendix 2 of this brief; second amended informations, Nos.
16269, 16271, 16272, appendix 3).

Defendant pleaded guilty to

these reduced charges, specifying that he did not admit guilt,
but wished to receive the benefit of the plea bargain (T. 2/13/85
at 53-54).

Along the lines of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the trial court questioned defendant about the pleas.
With each question, the trial court sought and received
defendant's oral understanding.

The court first reviewed

definitions of the originally-charged aggravated robberies,
"committed with the use of a firearm," as opposed to the pleadedto robberies "by force or fear" (T. 2/13/85 at 52; see §§ 76-6301, 302). It noted the reduced sentences made possible through
the plea agreement, specifying that the pleaded-to charges
carried one-to-fifteen year terms, rather than five-to-life (T.
2/13/85 at 52). The court warned defendant that his pleas waived
his jury trial right, with the attendant rights to confront
prosecution witnesses, to subpoena his own witnesses, and his
privilege against self-incrimination (jLd. at 53).
The court reminded defendant that his plea would be
treated as an admission of guilt, even though defendant did not
admit actual guilt (.id. at 53-54).

The prosecution's

recommendation of sentencing credit for time already served was
elicited, and defendant stated that he had not been coerced into
6

entering the guilty pleas (id. at 54-55).

Defendant asserted

that he was not then under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and
that he had reviewed his plea decision with counsel, and
understood it (ixi. at 55).
The trial court then reviewed a six-page "Expiation
Agreement" prepared by defendant and counsel (R. 104-109,
appendix 4 of this brief).

The expiation agreement repeated the

Rule 11 points addressed in the court's direct queries, and
included some that had been omitted:

for example, it recited

that at trial, the prosecution would have to prove defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 106 para. c). It set forth
defendant's understanding that his guilty pleas could result in
sentencing consecutive to any other offenses for which he might
be liable (R. 107 para, g), and that no recommendation as to
sentencing, made pursuant to his plea agreement, would be binding
on the court (R. 107 paras, h & i).
The expiation agreement further recited that defense
counsel had reviewed the facts of the cases against defendant, by
interviewing prosecution witnesses and reviewing other
prosecution evidence (R. 104 para. 1). Defendant acknowledged
that he had conferred with counsel, and had decided that the
circumstances of the case had left him "in a position of severe
exposure on being convicted on the 1st degree felonies originally
charged against me" (R. 105 para. 6). Accordingly, the document
stated, defendant agreed to enter guilty pleas to reduced, second
degree felony charges (JLd.; also R. 107 para. f).
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The expiation agreement finally recited that defendant
had read and understood its contents, and reviewed it with
counsel (R. 108 para. 9). Besides being signed by defendant and
counsel, defendant had initialled, in designated spaces, the
lettered paragraphs a through k of the agreement.

The trial

court noted this, and further ascertained that the agreement
contained a detailed recitation of the consequences of the pleas,
and had been read, reviewed with counsel, and understood by
defendant (T. 2/13/85 at 55-56).
A space for the trial court to sign the expiation
agreement was somehow left unsigned.

Nor did the court formally

announce that it found defendant's pleas to have been voluntarily
made.

Nevertheless, the court did impose sentence upon those

pleas (sentences on Nos. 16269, 16271, 16272, appendix 5 of this
brief).

On appeal, defendant recites that these sentences were

concurrent (Br. of Appellant at 3), a disposition that comports
with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1990) (unless otherwise
stated, sentences run concurrently).
The Plea Withdrawal Motion
The plea withdrawal motion was heard by Judge Roth;
Judge Hyde, who had accepted the pleas, recused himself from
consideration of the motion (R. 44). As stated earlier,
defendant's motion ultimately alleged that the trial court had
failed to substantially comply with Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, when it accepted defendant's guilty pleas.
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One of the several amendments to the motion, however,
had alleged that the Rule 11 deficiencies were attributable in
part to ineffective assistance by defense counsel (R. 62).
Accordingly, the State obtained an affidavit from that attorney,
Bernard Allen (R. 97-102, addendum B to Br. of Appellant).

In

his affidavit, Allen stated that he had discussed the case with
defendant "at great length" (R. 98, 101). During those
discussions, attorney Allen stated that defendant had
made it clear to me that he fully and
completely understood the facts of the case
against him and the elements of the crime[s]
that he ple[]d to in the [plea] negotiation.
. . . There is no question in my mind that
he fully understood what he was doing in
entering the p l e a . . . .
(R. 101-02).
Defendant moved to exclude Allen's affidavit as
hearsay, and as given in violation of the attorney-client
privilege (R. 119-20).

Responding, the State argued that in

claiming that Allen had ineffectively represented him, defendant
had waived his attorney-client privilege (R. 125).
Then, however, defendant's present counsel entered the
case (R. 135). New counsel clarified defendant's plea withdrawal
motion, omitting the ineffective counsel claim (R. 143-45).
Counsel renewed the request to exclude Allen's affidavit, on the
ground that it was irrelevant to the question of whether there
had been substantial compliance with Rule 11 when defendant
entered his guilty pleas (R. 144-45).

At the hearing of the plea

withdrawal motion, this argument was presented, along with the
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argument that Allen's affidavit violated the attorney-client
privilege (T. 10/9/91 at 8-9).
The crux of defendant's Rule 11-based argument was his
claim that the trial court had failed to adequately inquire into
the "factual basis" for his guilty pleas (T. 10/9/91 at 6-7).
Elaborating through counsel, defendant argued that the trial
court, before accepting the pleas, should have required the
prosecution to proffer the evidence that would have supported a
guilty verdict, had the matter proceeded to trial (id.)*

Such a

proffer, defendant argued, was especially important given that he
had technically pleaded guilty while simultaneously refusing to
admit actual guilt (Id.).
The State responded that inquiry into evidence of
actual guilt was discretionary, not required (T. 10/9/91 at 12).
It also argued that even without attorney Allen's affidavit, the
record when defendant entered his pleas demonstrated substantial
compliance with Rule 11. The State pointed out that the
informations, describing the victims, places, and times of the
crimes, had been provided to defendant, informing him of the
evidence (.id., at 13). The State brought defendant's expiation
agreement to the court's attention (id. at 13-15).

All this,

argued the State, "indicates that Mr. Stilling was well aware of
the evidence against him, of the facts involved in this case, the
elements of the crime.

He was making an intelligent decision to

enter a guilty plea" (id. at 14).
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After argument, the trial court entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law denying the plea withdrawal motion
(R. 157-60, addendum C to Br. of Appellant).

It first held, "If

the court were to rely only on the record as it existed at the
time of the pleas, that record would be insufficient to establish
substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11" (R. 159). This
amounted to an agreement that there had been inadequate inquiry
into the evidence when the pleas were originally accepted:

"At

the time the plea was taken by Judge Hyde on the issue of Rule 11
specifically, the issue of whether he convinced himself that the
Defendant understood the elements of the crime and how the facts
related to it, he was not in substantial compliance with Rule 11"
(T. 10/9/91 at 43).
Notwithstanding its ruling on Rule 11 compliance, the
trial court perceived the key question to be whether defendant's
plea had been knowingly and voluntarily entered.

It held that

the State could properly provide evidence, obtained after the
plea was entered, to answer this question, and thus "cure" the
Rule 11 defect (R. 159, T. 10/9/91 at 44). Accordingly, the
court admitted attorney Allen's affidavit as evidence on this
question (id.).

Based on that affidavit, "coupled with the

expiation agreement" (T. 10/9/91 at 44), the court held that
defendant's guilty pleas had been voluntarily and knowingly
entered (R. 159), and denied the motion to withdraw them.
appeal followed.

11

This

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As a proper alternative ground to affirm the trial
court's denial of the plea withdrawal motion, this Court should
hold that defendant's guilty pleas were entered in substantial
compliance with Rule 11. Although the trial court ruled to the
contrary, that ruling was induced by the erroneous assumption
that before accepting the plea, it was necessary to inquire into
the evidence of defendant's actual guilt.

As this Court has

already held, such inquiry, if required at all, need only be a
limited one; further, the need for such inquiry is reduced, not
increased, where a defendant pleads guilty while refusing to
admit actual guilt.

Accordingly, the trial court erroneously

ruled that there was not substantial compliance with Rule 11 when
defendant entered his guilty pleas.
Although this Court need not reach the issue, it may
choose to address the propriety of admitting additional evidence
pertaining to the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea,
when compliance with Rule 11 in taking such plea is later called
into question.

The trial court ruled that such evidence is

admissible; as a matter of settled principle and sound policy,
that ruling was correct.

The core due process query is whether a

guilty plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Therefore, a Rule 11 error, by itself, need not compel a
conclusion that the plea was involuntary or unknowing.

Such a

conclusion violates the principle that errors that do not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.
12

It would also be bad

policy to allow the withdrawal of guilty pleas, based only on
rule-based deficiencies, without regard to whether such pleas
were in fact voluntarily and knowingly given.
If post-plea evidence of a guilty plea's knowing and
voluntary nature can be admitted, the question of the form of
such evidence arises.

Under evidentiary and attorney conduct

rules, it appears that the affidavit of defendant's former
counsel was not barred by the attorney-client privilege:
defendant's allegation of counsel ineffectiveness "opened the
door" to it.

The former attorney also had discretion to breach

the privilege to prevent possible fraud:

his affidavit here did

this without revealing the actual content of any privileged
statements, and was therefore permissible.

Finally, if there was

error in this regard, it was harmless, for attorney Allen's
affidavit only repeated information found elsewhere in the record
of defendant's guilty pleas.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEAS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE
GROUND THAT THE PLEAS WERE TAKEN IN
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11, UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Defendant appeals the trial court's use of his former
counsel's affidavit as evidence that his guilty pleas were
knowingly and voluntarily entered.

This is a relatively

difficult issue because, as set forth in Point Three of this
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brief, it involves somewhat close questions about the boundaries
of the attorney-client privilege.
Fortunately, the issue framed by defendant need not be
reached.

Instead, this Court may affirm the denial of his plea

withdrawal motion on any proper alternative ground•

See State v.

Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985), and State v. Harrison, 805
P.2d 769, 782 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court ruling may be
affirmed on proper alternative ground, even if court assigned
another basis for it).

Such an alternative ground exists here,

in that defendant's pleas, contrary to the trial court's
determination, were entered in substantial compliance with Rule
11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A.

While the Trial Court's "No Substantial
Compliance" Ruling Should be Reviewed Without
Deference, Clear Error Can Also be Shown.
Defendant's pleas were entered prior to the issuance of

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), which mandates
strict compliance with Rule 11 in taking guilty pleas.

Defendant

acknowledges that his pleas, therefore, are reviewed only for
"substantial" Rule 11 compliance (Br. of Appellant at 9-10).
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Utah 1991).

As many as three

standards of appellate review may therefore apply.
When a trial court denies a motion to withdraw a plea
under the "substantial compliance" rule, that decision is
reversed on appeal only if it "clearly appears that the trial
judge abused his discretion."
424 (Utah 1987).

State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422,

See also Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150
14

(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990)
(applying "clear error"-based standard of review).

Such

deference seems appropriate with respect to the trial court's
ultimate decision to deny defendant's plea withdrawal motion.
Here, however, the trial court actually made a
subsidiary ruling that there had not been substantial Rule 11
compliance when defendant entered his guilty pleas.

To affirm

the ultimate denial of the plea withdrawal motion, then, the
State must show that this subsidiary "no substantial compliance"
ruling was erroneous.4

Defendant correctly identifies this as a

legal question, reviewable without deference to the trial court
(Br. of Appellant at 2).

Accord Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1124-25

(reviewing plea affidavit and colloquy upon entry of plea, and
"concluding] that the judge who took the plea substantially
complied with Rule 11(5)"); State v. Rodriguez, 718 P.2d 395
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (reviewing record and "expiation
agreement" submitted at time of plea, and finding "no merit" to
claim of defective plea).
Even if the trial court's "no substantial compliance"
ruling might be deferentially reviewed, it was clearly erroneous.
Clear error occurs when the appellate court is definitely and
firmly convinced that a mistake has been made, ,or when the trial
court's decision was induced by an erroneous view of the law.
A

On appeal, defendant describes this ruling as a "critical
finding by Judge Roth [that] has not been challenged by the state"
(Br. of Appellant at 11). Having ultimately prevailed in the
proceeding, the State was naturally disinclined to appeal any error
made en route to the ultimate outcome.
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See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting
authorities).
In light of the foregoing, the State will tackle the
Rule 11 issue in decreasing order of difficulty.

It will first

show that the trial court's "no substantial compliance" ruling
was induced by an erroneous view of the law.

It will then show

that on the record at the time the pleas were entered, there was
substantial compliance with Rule 11.
B.

Because Defendant Pleaded Guilty While Refusing to
Admit Actual Guilt, Little or No "Factual Basis"
Inquiry Was Required Under Rule 11.
As earlier recited, defendant urged the trial court

toward the view that when a guilty plea is offered by a defendant
who does not admit actual guilt, it is especially important,
before accepting the plea, to inquire into the factual basis for
guilt.

He cites North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.

160 (1970), in support of this view (Br. of Appellant at 10-11).
In the trial court, defense counsel offered to "bet bottom
dollar" on its validity (T. 10/9/91 at 6-7).
Counsel would have lost that bet.

In State v. Smith,

812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. May 30, 1991), cert, denied, No. 910347
(Utah Jan. 21, 1992), this Court, interpreting Alford, addressed
the question of how much factual or evidentiary inquiry is
required to accept a "no contest" or "nolo contendere" plea.
Such a plea is effectively identical to the situation presented
here, where defendant has pleaded guilty while refusing to admit
actual guilt.

See Smith, 812 P.2d at 475, 478 & n.4; Alford, 400
16

U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167 ("The fact that his plea was
denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea of nolo
contendere is of no constitutional significance . . . " ) .
The Smith Court noted that Rule 11(f), Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, requires federal courts to independently
examine the "factual basis" for a guilty plea*

However, the

Court continued, "this requirement is not found in the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure."

812 P.2d at 478. The Court stated that

this omission appears to reflect a determination of Utah's Rule
11 drafters "to limit independent fact finding," given that a
guilty plea, by waiving trial, effectively waives such fact
finding,

jrd. at 478 n.3.

The Court also quoted the federal

rulemakers' decision that the Rule 11(f) "factual basis" inquiry,
needed for a guilty plea, does not apply to no-contest pleas.
Id.

The Court thus concluded that arguments for a "factual

basis" inquiry under Utah's Rule 11 are weakened, not heightened,
when a defendant enters a no-contest plea.

812 P.2d at 478 n.3.

Insight into the "variety of reasons," id., for reduced
factual inquiry into a no-contest, or "guilty-but-not-admitted"
plea can be found in Alford.

The Alford Court did find that

"overwhelming" evidence of the defendant's actual guilt supported
his plea.

400 U.S. at 32, 37, 91 S. Ct. at 165, 167. However,

it also noted a division of authority regarding the need to
inquire into actual guilt when such a plea is entered.

400 U.S.

at 33-34, 91 S. Ct. at 165. Most authority was that such inquiry
should be limited, allowing a defendant who denies actual guilt
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to nevertheless plead guilty to a reduced charge, as happened
here, in order to avoid potential disaster in proceeding to
trial,

Jd.

The Supreme Court agreed:

"An individual accused of

crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or
unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime."

400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167.
Subsequent to Alford, the overwhelming view has

remained that inquiry into actual guilt is unnecessary, even
inadvisable, upon entry of a no-contest plea.

See, e.g., 1 C.

Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal 2d, § 177 at 671
& n.41; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 497 at 822-23 & n.63
(1981).

The inadvisability of such inquiry is supported by the

plea's main purpose:
against the defendant.

the avoidance of subsequent civil action
See V. Kanawalsky, Note, Nolo Contendere:

Acceptance in the Federal Courts, 10 Memphis State L. Rev. 550,
554-56 (1980).

Inquiry into actual guilt would erode such

protection, usually sought by those accused of "white-collar"
crime.

See id. at 556-58.
Defendant's view that heightened "factual basis"

inquiry was required because of his "guilty-but-not-admitted"
pleas was therefore contrary to law.

Such inquiry was, as the

State argued, within the discretion of the court that accepted
the pleas.

Smith, 812 P.2d at 478; accord United States v.

Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1978) (rejecting view
that such inquiry was barred altogether).
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To the extent that the

trial court accepted defendant's view, its ruling that there had
been an inadequate "factual basis" inquiry, and thus no
substantial compliance with Rule 11 when defendant's guilty pleas
were entered, was clearly erroneous.
C.

Defendant's Guilty Pleas Were Entered in
Substantial Compliance with Rule 11.
1.

Contents of the "Record as a Whole."

The State agrees that the only way to assess compliance
with Rule 11 is by examining the record made at the time a guilty
plea is entered.

By its terms, the rule requires certain steps

before the plea can even be accepted.

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)

("The court . . . may not accept the plea until . . . " ) .
Accordingly, the affidavit of attorney Allen, prepared
years after defendant entered his guilty pleas, is irrelevant to
the question of whether there was substantial compliance with
Rule 11 when those pleas were entered.5

However, defendant's

"Expiation Agreement," presented to the trial court at the time
of pleading, is highly relevant.

That agreement was clearly

equivalent to a "contemporaneously received [plea] affidavit,"
described in Smith, 812 P.2d at 476-77, and in Gibbons, 740 P.2d
at 1313. See State v. Rodriguez, 718 P.2d 395 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) ("expiation agreement" showed validity of plea); State v.
Eloae. 762 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) (same).

As such, the

expiation agreement became part of the "record as a whole"
5

As set forth in Point Two of this brief, the affidavit would,
however, be highly relevant to the question of whether defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered his pleas despite possible Rule
11 noncompliance.
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commemorating the pleas.

State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18

& n.l (Utah 1991); Smith, 812 P.2d at 477.
Nor can defendant seriously contend that the expiation
agreement should be disregarded because of the trial court's
failure to sign it.

During the actual plea colloquy, the court

addressed the agreement with defendant:
THE COURT: All right. Now he's
[defense counsel] also handed me a document
entitled Expiation Agreement, which is multipaged document, at the end of each paragraph
is a place for the defendant's initials.
This bears the initials M S.S. M . I take it
that means that you've been over this. If
there's any questions he has explained them
to you, and that's the purpose of the
initials at the end of each paragraph?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: This goes over in greater
detail than what I just went over with you,
right?
THE DEFENDANT:
(T. 2/13/85 at 55-56).

Yes, Your Honor.

The expiation agreement was received and

reviewed by the trial court, and defendant affirmed his
understanding of it, as required by Maquire. 830 P.2d at 218, and
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477, when he entered his guilty pleas.
Accordingly, it should now be examined, along with the plea
colloquy, to determine substantial compliance with Rule 11.
2.

Substantial Compliance:

Elements of the Crimes.

While this Court rejected a searching "factual basis"
inquiry under Rule 11 in Smith, it did observe that Rule 11(5)(d)
requires a determination that "defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea . .
20

. ."

812 P.2d at 477. This crime "synopsis" requirement, id.,

was amply satisfied when defendant entered his pleas.
First, during the plea colloquy, the trial court
personally reviewed the charges to which defendant was pleading
guilty, describing them as "robbery by force and fear" (T.
2/13/85 at 52); accord Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1990) (robbery
is "unlawful . . . taking . . . by means of force or fear").
This was contrasted to the original aggravated robbery charges,
"committed with the use of a firearm" (T. 2/13/85 at 52); accord
S 76-6-302 (1978) ("[u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm
. . .").6

Defendant was thus clearly apprised of the key

element of the pleaded-to crimes: he pleaded to robbing the
victims by fright, but without using a firearm.

Consequently,

his understanding of the elements of the pleaded-to crimes was
properly established.

See United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d

1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990) (critical elements, not every element,
of pleaded-to crime should be explained).
Next, defendant's expiation agreement acknowledged
receipt of the informations listing the pleaded-to robberies (R.
105 para. 5); those informations, in turn, set forth the place,
time, victim, and witnesses to each offense (second amended
informations, Nos. 16269, 16271, 16272, appendix 3 of this
brief).

See Maquire, 830 P.2d at 218 (information, incorporated

into record, helps reflect Rule 11 compliance).

6

The expiation

The aggravated robbery statute now refers to use of "a
dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990).
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agreement also recited defendant and counsel's belief that the
evidence placed defendant "in a position of severe exposure of
being convicted on the 1st degree felonies originally charged
against me" (R. 105 para. 6). This demonstrated the knowing and
voluntary nature of defendant's guilty pleas.

See Marshall v.

Lonberqer, 459 U.S. 422, 428, 437-38, 103 S. Ct. 843, 847-48,
852-53 (1983) (oral stipulation that evidence could sustain
guilty verdict supported guilty plea).
Again, it was neither necessary nor advisable for the
trial court, in accepting defendant's pleas, to make an
independent assessment of actual guilt.
defendant and counsel to mak€).

That assessment was for

"[T]he Constitution does not bar

imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling
to expressly admit his guilt but who, faced with grim
alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the
sentence."

Alford, 400 U.S. at 36, 91 S. Ct. at 167.

made just such a fully-advised choice here.

Defendant

Indeed, by relying

on defendant's assessment of the evidence, and not independently
assessing it, "the trial court properly avoided pressuring [him]
to plead one way or the other, helping to assure that his plea
was voluntary."

Smith, 812 P.2d at 479 & n.6.

At this juncture, it is appropriate to revisit the
"factual basis" requirement advocated by defendant, but actually
absent from Utah's Rule 11.

Inasmuch as that term means "factual

basis for actual guilt," such was present here on the record as a
whole, despite the lack of searching inquiry during the plea
22

colloquy.

It would have been unnecessarily repetitive to demand

an oral "proffer from one of the parties, typically the
prosecutor, regarding what its evidence would be that would
sustain a guilty verdict . . .," as defendant urges (Br. of
Appellant at 10-11).

Such "proffer" was effectively given in the

robbery informations—received, acknowledged, and reviewed by
defendant and counsel—which recited the particulars of the
crimes and the witnesses who would testify to them.

Accord

Lonbercrer, 459 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S. Ct. at 852 (record
demonstrated understanding of pleaded-to crime, even though
evidence not expressly reviewed by trial court).

The record here

amply demonstrates that defendant understood both the crimes and
the supporting evidence.
It is further worth noting that a factual basis for
guilt can be distinguished from a factual basis for pleading
guilty.

The former encompasses the actual evidence of the

crimes.

However, a factual basis for pleading guilty is provided

when defendant, upon reviewing the evidence, believes that it
could result in conviction at trial. A plea to reduced charges,
based upon such an informed opinion, "represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the various courses of action open to
the defendant."

Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S. Ct. at 164.

Defendant made just such a choice here.
In sum, it is abundantly clear that, as required by
Rule 11(5)(d), defendant understood the nature and elements of
the pleaded-to crimes when he entered his guilty pleas.
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Not only

was this "synopsis" requirement met, but Rule 11 was actually
exceeded, for the record shows that evidence of defendant's
actual guilt was presented, even though not required.
3.

Substantial Compliance:

Other Rule 11 Factors,

Beyond his "factual basis" or "crime synopsis"
arguments, defendant does not seem to assert any other Rule 11
deficiencies.

Indeed, based upon the record of the entry of

defendant's pleas—that is, the plea colloquy, the expiation
agreement, and the informations received by defendant, it
strongly appears that Rule 11 was strictly complied with-

Only

substantial compliance, however, was required.
The only possible defect that the State can find is the
trial court's failure to "advise the defendant personally that
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court,"
per Rule 11(7)(b) (emphasis added).

Defendant acknowledged this

understanding, however, in his expiation agreement (R. 107 paras,
h & i).

In Smith, this Court suggested that Rule 11(7)(b) might,

by its terms, require oral review during the plea colloquy.

812

P.2d at 477 & n.2. However, Gibbons implies that this is not
necessary, in stating that the provision can be addressed in the
plea affidavit, 740 P.2d at 1313 & n.5, and Maauire reiterates
that Rule 11 compliance can be met "by multiple means," including
an affidavit, 830 P.2d at 218. Further, defendant has not
asserted that he was in any way surprised by the sentence meted
out upon his guilty pleas. Accordingly, even if the non-binding
nature of sentencing recommendations was conveyed to him in a
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technically inadvisable way, he cannot be relieved of his guilty
pleas on this basis.

Instead, under Rule 30, Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure, such technical error must be disregarded.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's
subsidiary ruling that there was not substantial compliance with
Rule 11 when defendant entered his guilty pleas should be
reversed.

As a matter of law, the rule plainly was obeyed.

Consequently, the court properly exercised its discretion when it
ultimately denied defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, even
though it assigned another reason for that decision.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED; POST-PLEA EVIDENCE TO
THIS EFFECT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, ALTHOUGH
UNNECESSARY.
The centerpiece of defendant's appeal is his argument
that the trial court improperly admitted supplemental evidence,
not presented when his guilty pleas were entered, to assess the
validity of those pleas.

Because the denial of the plea

withdrawal motion can be affirmed solely as set forth in Point
One of this brief, this argument need not be reached.

However,

to clarify the handling of motions to withdraw guilty pleas, as
requested by the trial court (T. 10/9/91 at 45), defendant's
evidentiary challenge may be briefly addressed.
A.

Defendant's Guilty Pleas were Knowingly and
Voluntarily Entered.
It is first worth noting that in moving to withdraw his

pleas, defendant never asserted that they were involuntary or
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unknowing, and therefore accepted in violation of his due process
rights (petition to set aside plea, R. 1-3, addendum A to Br. of
Appellant; memorandum of clarification, R. 143-45, appendix 1 of
this brief).

See Marshall v. Lonberqer, 459 U.S. 422, 431, 103

S. Ct. 843, 849 (1983) (plea voluntariness is issue of
constitutional due process).

Even on appeal, he only alludes

generally to the indisputable principle that "[t]here is no
societal value in coercing fearful but innocent defendants into
pleading guilty" (Br. of Appellant at 10); accord State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987).
claim, however, that he was so abused:

Defendant does not

solely a Rule 11-based

argument is presented.
Even if defendant wished to show that his guilty pleas
were involuntarily or unknowingly entered, he could not succeed.
Based upon the same arguments showing Rule 11 compliance, set
forth in Point One, his pleas clearly were constitutionally
sound.

By no stretch of imagination does this case approach the

situation presented in Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239, 89
S. Ct. 1709, 1710 (1969), where "[s]o far as the record showfed],
the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea,
and petitioner did not address the court.11

Nor is this a case

where, as in State v. Breckenridqe, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), the
defendant clearly did not understand the requisite intent element
of the pleaded-to crime.7

Instead, when these pleas were

7

In Breckenridqe. the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated
arson, involving intent to damage a structure, Utah Code Ann. § 766-103 (1990), even though in his statements to police he had
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entered, the trial court was assured that defendant, assisted by
counsel, understood the crimes, weighed the risks and benefits,
and made a fully informed decision to enter guilty pleas instead
of proceeding to trial.
Therefore, in considering the plea withdrawal motion,
the trial court correctly ruled that defendant had knowingly and
voluntarily entered his guilty pleas.

The trial court did not

need to consider any evidence beyond the record of the plea entry
to arrive at that conclusion of constitutional law:

that

conclusion was compelled by the plea colloquy, the expiation
agreement, and the information revealed therein.
B.

Had there Been Rule 11 Noncompliance, Supplemental
Evidence Pertaining to the Knowing and Voluntary
Nature of the Pleas Would have been Proper.
Unless Rule 11 noncompliance is to be considered

prejudicial error per se, it is appropriate to consider
supplemental evidence pertaining to the knowing and voluntary
nature of a guilty plea when a defendant later seeks to withdraw
it.

After all, Rule 11 assures the validity of a plea, but is

not, in itself, the constitutional imperative that must be
satisfied.

This comports with the principle of Rule 30, Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure:

unless a procedural error violates

a substantial right, it must be disregarded.
The Utah Supreme Court implicitly adopted this approach
in Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493
U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990).

There the supreme court found

clearly denied such intent, 688 P.2d at 441.
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"clear" noncompliance with Rule 11 when the challenged pleas were
accepted, 784 P.2d at 1149. However, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw the
pleas, and then denied the motion. j[d. The supreme court
readily affirmed the trial court's ruling, set forth in written
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the pleas had been
knowingly and voluntarily entered.

JEd. at 1150.

Similarly, in

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988), the supreme
court remanded a case for fact finding on defendant's
understanding of his plea bargain, a question encompassed within
the requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary and knowing.
Jolivet and Copeland demonstrate that it is proper,
when a defendant later seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, to
receive all evidence pertinent to the question of whether that
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.

As such, these

cases, decided under Utah's Rule 11, control.

United States v.

Keiswetter, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989), interpreting the
federal rule, is not controlling.
Further, wise policy suggests that supplemental
evidence is desirable when, as here, a defendant moves to
withdraw a plea years after it is entered.

Compare Keiswetter,

866 F.2d at 1301-02 (defendant moved to withdraw pleas eleven
days after entering them).

When a guilty plea is withdrawn under

such circumstances, reinstating trial, evidence is likely to be
stale, witnesses less reliable.

The task of proving guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt may be insurmountable.
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Worse, witnesses who

were traumatized by the crime(s) may be required to reopen
psychological wounds during such a long-delayed trial.8 To
avoid such undesirable results, if evidence can be found to show
that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived trial in the
first place, even if such waiver did not fully comport with the
letter of Rule 11, it should always be admissible.
Finally, a guilty plea entered as part of a plea
bargain should not be easily withdrawn.

Here defendant

originally faced four first degree felony charges, plus a
habitual criminal charge; conviction of any one of these could
have resulted in lifetime incarceration.

See Utah Code Ann. §§

76-3-203(1) (first degree felony), 76-8-1001 (habitual criminal)
(1990).

Instead, he pleaded guilty to three second degree

felonies, receiving concurrent one-to-fifteen year terms.

Given

the difficulties in trying the original charges now, defendant's
plea withdrawal motion amounts, in effect, to a demand that he
receive more than he bargained for in pleading guilty.

This

should not be allowed, except upon the clearest showing, by
defendant, that his pleas were constitutionally defective.

He

has made no such showing here.

8

Indeed, in Smith, defendant pleaded no-contest to attempted
sexual abuse of a two-and-one-half-year-old girl, an event that
took place in September 1986. His attempt to withdraw the plea,
entered in July 1987, began in September 1989. 812 P.2d at 473-74.
A good argument can be made that requiring the alleged victim to
testify at trial, had the plea withdrawal motion been granted,
would itself have been a form of child abuse.
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POINT THREE
TESTIMONY FROM FORMER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS
PROPERLY USED TO DETERMINE THE VOLUNTARINESS
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS; HOWEVER, EVEN IF
SUCH TESTIMONY WAS IMPROPERLY RECEIVED, THE
ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
Defendant finally argues that even if supplemental
evidence of the voluntariness of his pleas was admissible, such
evidence could not include the testimony, by affidavit, of his
former attorney, Bernard Allen (Br. of Appellant at 15).9
Again, this question of attorney-client privilege need not be
reached in order to resolve this appeal:

defendant's pleas were

taken in at least substantial compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and were therefore valid.
A.

If the Question is Considered, Former Counsel's
Affidavit Did Not Necessarily Violate the
Attorney-Client Privilege.
If the attorney-client privilege issue is addressed,

the appropriate starting point is Rule 504, Utah Rules of
Evidence.

While vesting such privilege in the client, the rule

also states that there is no privilege with respect to "a
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the
lawyer to the client . . .."

Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3).

Accord

Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71, 9 S. Ct. 125, 127
(1888).

Defendant's claim of counsel ineffectiveness thus

invited attorney Allen's affidavit in response.

9

In denying defendant's motion to quash attorney Allen's
affidavit, the trial court ruled that defendant could submit
supplemental affidavits, or call Allen to testify. This corrected
any possible hearsay problem with Allen's affidavit.
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Ethical rules are also relevant.

Rule 1.6(b)(3), Utah

Rules of Professional [Attorney] Conduct also restricts the
attorney-client privilege when disclosure of a client confidence
is needed " [t]o establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client . .
Rule 1.6 does not expressly except the privilege in order "to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client" (Br. of Appellant at 17-18).
However, the rule's commentary indicates that when "the integrity
of the lawyer's own conduct is involved, the principle of
confidentiality may have to yield."
to Client,

Comment, Disclosure

Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6.

Adverse

Thus Utah's ethical rules

appear to comport with evidentiary Rule 504(d)(3), above.10
Defendant's withdrawal of the counsel ineffectiveness
allegation may have obliged the trial court to disregard attorney
Allen's affidavit, given in response.

The allegation had been

made by defendant acting pro se (R. 61-62); perhaps his lack of
legal expertise should excuse him from thus "opening the door" to
Allen's affidavit, especially since subsequently-obtained counsel

10

To the extent this issue implicates ethical rules of attorney
conduct, this Court may wish to proceed with caution. Article
VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. § 782-4(3) (1992) may make construction of those rules the sole
province of the Utah Supreme Court: "The [Utah] Supreme Court by
rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to
practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
practice law." The code chapter that created this Court grants it
no similar disciplinary authority. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-l
through -5 (1992).
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withdrew the ineffectiveness allegation.

This, however, is by no

means certain.
Even absent a claim of counsel ineffectiveness, or some
other clear dispute between counsel and former client, counsel
may breach the attorney-client privilege in certain instances.
Again, the commentary to ethical Rule 1.6(b)(4) reflects that
counsel is permitted, in his or her professional discretion, to
reveal client communication in order to prevent subsequent
fraudulent client conduct.
Client,

Comment, Disclosure

Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6.

Adverse

to

Attorney Allen, if he

perceived defendant to be falsely alleging that his guilty pleas
were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, could have
legitimately breached the attorney-client privilege in order to
prevent such fraud.
In fact, attorney Allen's affidavit appears
appropriately limited to information that an attorney "may
reveal" under Rule 1.6(b).

Nowhere, for example, does he reveal

any admission of actual guilt by his former client.

He merely

states his assessment of defendant's ability to understand and
deliberate upon the evidence, and upon the options available to
him in the face of that evidence (R. 97-102, addendum B to Br. of
Appellant).

He does not reveal actual attorney-client

communications, as that term is defined in evidentiary Rule
504(a)(5) ("communications" include lawyer's advice, and the
client's disclosures).

Allen's affidavit presents an opinion

32

arising from attorney-client communications, but not the
communications themselves•
B.

Any Error in Admitting Former Counsel's Affidavit
was Harmless.
Finally, Allen's affidavit really does no more than

reiterate what is already clear in the record created when
defendant actually entered his guilty pleas. Again, defendant's
colloquy with the trial court, along with his written expiation
agreement, show that he carefully considered his options, and
decided to plead guilty, under a plea bargain, to lesser
offenses.

Accordingly, any error in the consideration of

attorney Allen's affidavit was harmless:

the knowing and

voluntary nature of defendant's guilty pleas was amply set forth
in other, clearly admissible evidence.
CONCLUSION
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was amply
obeyed by the trial court when defendant's guilty pleas were
entered in 1985.

On the record then made, it is also clear that

defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered those pleas.

Those

pleas were therefore valid as a matter of rule and of
constitutional law.

For these reasons alone, the trial court's

denial of defendant's later motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
should be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

15* day of October, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

v
J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jo
Carol Nesset-Sale, HALEY & STOLEBARGER, 10th Floor Walker Center,
175 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for
defendant-appellant, this ' ^> day of October, 1992.
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APPENDIX 1
Defendant's Memorandum of Clarification

JO CAROL NESSET-SALE
#2398
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801/531-1555
Facsimile: 801/328-1419
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*Liz»*
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

t
:

MEMORANDUM OF CLARIFICATION
OF PENDING MOTION

VS.

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,
Defendant.

::

Case No. 900902323

:

Judge David O. Roth

The Plaintiff, Steven Stilling, by and through his
attorney, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, hereby files this memorandum to
clarify the nature of the hearing set for October 9, 1991.
Although variously

styled

in prior pleadings

as a

Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Set Aside Guilty Plea or
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the relief sought has
been vacation of the guilty pleas of Steven Stilling (hereinafter
"Defendant11) to multiple counts of Robbery, a second degree felony,
which were entered on or about the 13th day of February, 1985, by
the Second District Court, the Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde presiding.
In response to the pleadings the State filed a Motion to
Dismiss, claiming that the allegations made in the petition were
unsupported and that a writ may not substitute for a direct appeal.

.143

An accurate characterization of Defendant's pleading
intention is a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Pleas; that is the
name of the proper motion that should be before the court and
Defendant hereby restyles his pleadings to conform to that intent.
The basis for the motion is that Judge Hyde did not
substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the standard that applies to guilty
pleas that were taken prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309
(Utah 1987).

In the court's most recent case on the withdrawal of

guilty pleas# State v. Hoff. 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, (July 3, 1991),
it clarified the pre- and post-Gibbons standards. (A copy is
attached hereto.)

It requires that the record be sufficient to

support the conclusion that a Defendant "understood the elements of
the crimes charged and how those elements related to the facts.11
Id. at p.24.
The critical issue before this court then is whether the
record of the proceeding before Judge Hyde meets the requisite
standard.

Because of the opinions in Gibbons and Hoff and the

cases cited therein, it is clear that the court requires that the
record made at the time of the taking of the guilty plea supports
a finding of substantial compliance with Rule 11, else the guilty
plea may be withdrawn.
Consequently, the Affidavit of Bernie Allen, executed at
the request of the State nearly six years after the entry of
Defendants guilty pleas, is irrelevant as that affidavit is not
part of the record before Judge Hyde; and it is that record that
2
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must show substantial compliance with Rule 11.
Defendant

contends

that

the

record

demonstrates

a

lack

of

substantial compliance with Rule 11, and expects to argue its
failings on October 9.
Additionally, prior to the 1989 amendment, Utah Code
Annotated 77-13-6 permitted the withdrawal of a guilty plea "upon
good cause shown and with leave of court." No time limit was
imposed until April 24, 1989, when (2)(b) became effective; it
requires such motions to be made within thirty days of entry of the
plea. Hoff involved a plea entered in 1985 and sought to be
withdrawn in 1990. The appellate court did not find it to be
untimely.
Based on the record before Judge Hyde, Defendant will
urge the court to find a lack of substantial compliance with Rule
11 and permit Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Dated this

/0

day of September, 1991.

Jo Cfc*ol Nesset-Sale
Att/xrney for Defendant
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APPENDIX 2
Transcript of Entry of Guilty Pleas

Now between now and the 7th we will have a deter-

1

2 mination on that.
THE COURT:

S

All right.

So the other trial date

4 will just stand.
6

MR. ALLEN:

Right.

6

MR. DAINES:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. ALLEN: We won't lose track of them.

9

THE COURT:

You're past the 120 days now anyway

10

MR. ALLEN:

We were past that before January 8th,

That is fine.
Don't lose track of this one.

11 way back in December.
MR. DAINES:

12

This was set on today's calendar, so

13 the record is clear, for a plea of guilty.
14

MR. ALLEN:

For plea, that's correct.

15

THE COURT:

All right.

16

MR. ALLEN:

No, Your Honor.

Anything else?

17
FEBRUARY 13, 1985 SESSION

18
19

THE COURT:

State vs. Steven Stillings.

20

THE COURT:

Are you ready?

21

MR. ALLEN:

This is here today for change of plea

22 The State is intending to file an amended information to
23 16269, 71 and 72,amending to robberies, second degree felonies^
24

The defendant is intending to enter a plea of guilty

25 to those three.
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THE COURT:

1

Now you filed three amended

2 informations.
3

MR. DAINES:

4

THE COURT:

That's correct.
All right, Mr. Stillings, I have to

6 go over this with you to make sure that it's knowledgeable

e and voluntary; you understand that?
7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

MR. ALLEN:

Yes, sir.

We have prepared an expiation

9 agreement that I would like to give to the court. Your Honor
10 has already seen a copy.
THE COURT:

11

(hands document to the court)

Now, Mr. Stillings, the State has now

12 filed three amended informations, now charging second degree
13 felonies, robbery by force and fear.

They were first degree

14 felonies, committed with the use of a firearm.
The first degree felony with a firearm carried five

15

16 years to life, plus one, plus possibly five. You understand
17 that?
18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

The second degree felony carry not

20 less than one year nor more than fifteen years.
They are both felonies, however.

21

You do understand

22 that?
23

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

24

THE COURT: All right;

Now if I understand

25 orrectly,you now intend to plead guilty to these informations
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1

as charged.
THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

S
4

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

6

8
9
10

truthfulness, veracity, etc.

17

You also waive those rights when you plead guilty.
You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

20

23
24
25

Now at all times you have the

to trial you cannot be required to take the witness stand,or
you may do so if you want to.
When you plead guilty, you are admitting the unlawful
act and intenti to the extent that you incriminate yourself
by your plea.

You understand that?

MR. ALLEN:

21
22

Yes, sir.

privilege against self-incrimination, which means if you go

18
19

You have the subpoena power of

the State behind you in ordering witnesses in for your side.

14

16

If you go to trial you have the right

them here, submit them to cross examination,test them for

13

15

Yes, Your Honor.

to be confronted by witnesses against you, which means have

11
12

Now you understand when you enter a

plea of guilty you are waiving your right to a trial by jury?

5

7

Yes, Your Honor.

Your Honor.

He's not intending to admit guilt,

He understands that that's the effect as far as

Your Honor's concerned in terms of sentencing and such, that
the effect of that is that Your Honor is to assume guilt, tha
the defendant is pleading guilty under, his rights to accept
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A

2 the plea negotiations, that he feels is to hi- benefit. He
2

is not admitting guilt.
THE COURT: But you understand your plea will be

S
4
5

treated by me as an admission of guilt and sentence imposed
thereon?
THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7
8

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

10

13

15

THE COURT:

(inposing)

I understand that this

MR. ALLEN:

That's right.

THE COURT:

But in regard to the pleas to the

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

Other than the filing

of the amended:information, which is second degree felonies,
have you been given any promises to cause a plea?
MR. ALLEN:

23

25

We understand that there—

THE DEFENDANT:

20

24

MR. ALLEN:

information itself?

19

22

You understand that?

intend to appeal to the Sppreme Court, the previous order?

17

21

Yes, sir.

one ruling we made in regard to your motion to dismiss you

16

18

If you are convicted at

When you plead guilty, you don't

leave much to appeal from.

12

14

All right.

trial you have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court.

9

11

Yes, sir, for sentencing. Sure.

Mr. Daines has agreed to recommend

some credit for time served regarding the offense, but other
than that and the fact that we are intending to appeal that
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issue on the detainer.
THE COURT:

2
3

But other than that, no.
But you realize as far as I am

concerned, I will just be required to impose sentence.

4„

THE DEFENDANT:

BII

THE COURT: All right.

.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

8

10

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

THE COURT:

14

You have had ample time to go over

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

17

Yes, sir.

He's answered your questions as best

he can?
THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE COURT:

22

Yes, Your Honor.

You feel you understand it?

THE DEFENDANT:

21

25

Yes, sir.

this with counsel?

16

24

No, sir.

Your head is clear?

THE DEFENDANT:

13

23

You are not under the influence of

mind?

12

18

No, sir.

any drugs or alcohol, or anything that will confuse your

11

15

Has anyone made any

threats to coerce a plea in any way?

7

9

I understand.

Yes, sir.

All right.

Now he's also handed me

a document entitled Expiation Agreement, which is multi-paged
document, at the end of each paragraph is a place for the
defendant's initials.
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j take it that means that you've been over this.

If there's

2

any questions he has explained them, and that's the purpose

s

of the initials at the end of each paragraph?
THE DEFENDANT:

4
,11

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

This goes over in greater detail

.. than what I just went over with you, right?
THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8
9
10

got?

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Let's see.

What have we

And the State is going to

Yes, Your Honor.

I might state for the record that the reason the
State is willing to reduce these three charges one degree for
the purpose of a plea is that (1) Mr. Stillings has an
extensive prior record, and I think it is pretty obvious he
will be sent to prison on this.

(2) At a previous hearing

Your Honor had ordered that the State will pay for witnesses
to be brought in by the defense. And because of the fact
that Salt Lake has many more cases than we do, and because
of the expense to the county of bringing all these witnesses
in, his plea to this, which will sentence him to prison, is
sufficient for us.
I have gone over this with the police department, and

23
24

16269, 16271, 16272, huh?

MR. DAINES:

12

14

All right.

be moving to dismiss the other one?

11

IS

Yes, Your Honor.

this is what they want to do.

It would be very costly to

bring the number of witnesses that he is requesting.
25
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THE COURT:

1
2II
3

with 16269.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

6

felony, robbery.

MR. ALLEN:

15
16
17
18

court.

23

because of his inability to be here at the hearings and
decisions that were made prior, wanted to put into the
record an affidavit stating his position on the thing.
THE COURT:

That is just a matter of filing.

MR. ALLEN:

That's correct.

We are going to

file those, although I have brought only one copy there are
three files.

I'll have to make additional copies.

But we

are filing these concurrent.
MR. DAINES:

24
25

One is a notice of appeal and designation of record.

The other is an affidavit that Mr. Richards put out. He,

20

22

Your Honor, we would waive time for

I do have two things I would like to submit to the

19

21

Guilty, Your Honor.

sentencing at this time.

IS
14

How do you plead?

THE DEFENDANT:

11

Guilty, Your Honor.

And 16272 also charges a second

degree felony, robbery.

10

12

How do you plead?

THE COURT:

8

Guilty, Your Honor.

And 16271 now charges a second degree

THE DEFENDANT:

7

9

The charge is second degree felony, robbery

II How do you plead to that amended Information'?

4

6

Well, Mr. Stillings, let's start

Your Honor, I would like to reserve

the right to file my own statement or position against his
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jl since he wasn't here, because I don't agree with some of the
2

things he said.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. DAINES:

5

THE COURT:

Well, you can file that.
Thank you.
Mr. Stillings, you're entitled to

6

time before I sentence you.

7

sentence you at this time?
MR. ALLEN:

8

You are requesting that I

Yes, Your Honor, the defendant has

9

one request to make.

He has got as you can see a thing

l0

wrong with his hand.

He has just had a carpel tunnel syndromi

n

surgery.

12

on Monday.

There is one remaining visit that needs to be made

THE DEFENDANT:

13

I don't know.

He believes it

will be on Monday.
THE COURT:

15
16

Well, once I impose sentence I lose

jurisdiction.
MR. ALLEN:

17

Well, he would like that in light of

18

sentence, and stay his transportation until Tuesday if

19

possible.
THE DEFENDANT:

20
x

Is it this week, the appointment;

do you know?

22

MR. ALLEN:

If he's not taken down Thursday he

23

will not go down until Tuesday, and that will allow him to

24

take care of that.

gg

THE COURT:

But I normally do not control the

sheriff's department.
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MR. ALLEN;

1

I understand that.

I believe that if

2 Your Honor made that request they would abide by it.
THE COURT: What is it, a local doctor?
3
THE DEFENDANT:
Yes, they did the operation at
4
McKay Dee on my wrist.
6
THE COURT: You have to go back for what?
6
THE DEFENDANT One more finger. There is the
7
problem still there in one of the fingers. He wanted to see
8
me. I was supposed to have been there last week when I was
9
in jail in Salt Lake. I missed this court appearance arid
10
that, and my doctor's appointment. So now it is rescheduled
11
until this week.
12
THE COURT: The jail didn't send you. Salt Lake
13
sent up.
14
MR. ALLEN: Yes, but because of that he did have
15
difficulty missing his last appointment with the doctor.
16
It would be helpful both to whoever will be treating him and
17
the prison to have that final meeting with the doctor.
18
THE COURT: All right.
19
MR. ALLEN: We're ready to be sentenced.
20
THE COURT: All right. On File 16269, you are
21
then sentenced to a term in the state penitentiary, not less
22
than one year nor more than fifteen.
25
On 16271, you are sentenced to serve a term not less
24
than one year nor more than fifteen years.
25
And 16272, you are sentenced to a term not less than
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1

one year nor more than fifteen years
MR.

2

ALLEN :

Okay, Your Honor.

S

THE COURT:

4

MR. ALLEN: 16270.

5II

MR. DAINES:

7I

8

II

THE COURT:

16270?

MR. ALLEN:

Also there is the habitual.

MR. DAINES:

10

THE COURT:

jjl

MR. DAINES:
motion to dismiss.

12
13

„ this

14

II

IS

The enhancement.

The habitual criminal charge.

THE COURT:

It is in the 70?

THE COURT:

19

We are making a

MR. ALLEN:

MR. DAINES:

18

It's in all of them?
Just one.

Which one is it?
Well, it is not part of the complaintj

or information.
THE DEFENDANT:

21

It's a separate information,

Your Honor.
MR. DAINES:

23
24

Pardon?

THE DEFENDANT:

17

22

The enhancement.

He is not pleading to the enahancement on

MR. DAINES:

16

20

Case 16270, the State would move to

dismiss.

6

g

Now what's the other-one?

It wasn't part of the amended

information, Your Honor, so it is not there.
THE DEFENDANT:

25

/rQ

Okay.

EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R.
437 MUNICIPAL BLDG.

«J f% «^

THE COURT: Your motion to dismiss 16270 will be
1
2

granted.
MR. DAINES: Thank you, Your Honor.

3
4

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

6
6 (I

This is to certify that I, Evelyn S. Funk, am

7 one of the official court reporters of the Second Judicial
8 District Court of Utah; that I was present in court during
9

the above hearings in the aforesaid matter; that thereat I

10 reported in stenograph the proceedings had.
11

The foregoing pages of transcript, 1 to 6l,

12 inclusive, constitute a full, true and accurate transcript
13 of my said stenographic notes of said hearings.
14

Dated and signed this 17th day of February,

15 1 1985.
16
1 8 II

Officii Court Reporter

19

20
21
22
23
24
25
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EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R.
437 MUNICIPAL BLDG.
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APPENDIX 3
Second Amended Informations, to Which Defendant Pleaded Guilty

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

FEB 15 11 i«>if£5r

Plaintiff,

AMENDED INFOBUfrlON
WEE EH

vs.

. ,

^LEfiK'

Circuit No. 84-333F

STEVEN M. STILLINGS

District No. 16*69

Defendant.
DOB: 4/19/51

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

ss

«

The undersigned Complainant upon oath s t a t e s t h a t the
Complainant has reason t o b e l i e v e that the above named Defendant on or about the
31 ST day of MARCH, 1984 i n Weber County, State of Utah committed a

second degree felony to-wit:
ROBBERY, 76-6-301 UCA as follows:
Said defendant did unlawfully take personal property in the possession of Ted
Browne (U & I COOP) from his person, or immediate presence, against his w i l l ,
accomplished by means of force or fear.

WILLIAM F. DAINES, Ccmplainan
ainant
Case No. ROY PD 84-1649
This information i s based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
RODNEY BAILEY
TOD MC EL YE A
LT. ROCHELL, ROY PD
Authorized for presentment

Subscribed and sworn t o

and filing:

before me this 14 th day
of January, 1985.

DONALD C. HUGHES,
COUNTY ATTORNEY

~

L£LL
/ru.
NOTARY PUBLi
Residing i n Weber >66unty, Utah
My commission e x p i r e s : 11/1/87

DEPUTY WILLIAM F. DAINES

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED INFi
WEBER ;.. • •
RIC!!A:;|.K o.vj

STEVEN M. STILLINGS

C i r c u i t No. 8H-335F

Defendant.
DOB:

D i s t r i c t No. 16271

V19/51

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
)

ss

«

The undersigned Complainant upon oath s t a t e s t h a t the
Complainant has reason t o b e l i e v e that the above named Defendant on or about the
31st day of March, 1984 i n Weber County, State of Utah committed a
second degree felony t o - w i t :
ROBBERY, 76-6-301 UCA as f o l l o w s :
Said defendant did unlawfully take personal property i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of Earl
Deroboam from h i s person, or immediate presence, a g a i n s t h i s w i l l , accomplished
by means of f o r c e or f e a r .

WILLIAM F. DAINES, Complainant
Case No. OPD 84-9162
This information i s based on evidence obtained from the f o l l o w i n g w i t n e s s e s :
EARL DE ROB0AM
TOM HADDLEY
C. M. ZIMMERMAN, OPD
Authorized f o r presentment

and filing:
DONALD C HUGHES,
COUNTY ATTORNEY

Subscribed and sworn t o
before me t h i s 14 th day
of January, 1985.
3TARY PUBLIC
Residing i n Weber bounty, Utah
My commission e x p i r e s : 11/1/87

BY
DEPUTY WILLIAM F. DAINES
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

FEBK

SECONf
AMENDED INFOMITION

Plaintiff,

vs.

RICH;."-. • • "••--

STEVEN M. ST3LLINGS

C i r c u i t No. 84-336F
D i s t r i c t No. 16272

Defendant.
DOB:

WVW%

4/19/51

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

)
)

ss

«

The undersigned Complainant upon oath s t a t e s t h a t the
Complainant has reason t o b e l i e v e that the above named Defendant on or about the
31st day of March, 1984 i n Weber County, State of Utah committed a
second degree felony t o - w i t :
ROBBERY, 76-6-301 UCA as follows:
Said defendant did unlawfully take personal property in the possession of
Dorothy Smith (Wangsgard's Market) from her person, or immediate presence,
against her w i l l , accomplished by means of force or fear.

WILLIAM F. DAINES, Complainant
Case No. OPD 84-9154
This information i s based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
MIKE RODELL
DOROTHY SMITH
TOM HADLEY
Authorized f o r presentment

and filing:
DONALD C. HUGHES,
COUNTY ATTORNEY

BY

[AjdukjtHM^-W<*JU^

DEPUTY WILLIAM F. DAINES

Subscribed and sworn t o
before me t h i s 14 th day
of January, 1985.
NOTARY PUBLIC
/IT)
Residing i n Weber County, Utah
My commission e x p i r e s : 11/1/76

APPENDIX 4
Expiation Agreement,
Submitted Contemporaneously with Pleas
(NOTE: The expiation agreement is reproduced
in all four records on appeal. Citations in
this brief are to pages in the record of the
plea withdrawal motion, as circled in the
reproductions contained in this appendix)

Bernard L. Allen of
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorney for Defendant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 3994194

FEB!"

2s3PJjife

RICilA:-;' ••>

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
EXPIATION AGREEMENT
Plaintiff,
Case No.

i±^f^7%

vs.
STEVEN M. STILLINGS,
Defendant.
1. As your attorney, I advise you that I have*gone
over the facts of your cases very carefully, and have talked
with the State's key witness and have the statements of all
the witnesses which the law enforcement officers and the
prosecuting attorney claim to have.
2. As I have explained to you, you are charged with
crimes in Weber County, as follows:
Crime
Agg. Robbery
Agg. Robbery
Agg. Robbery
Agg. Robbery
Habitual Criminal

Class or
Degree
1st Degree
1st Degree
1st Degree
1st Degree
Enhancement

Statutory Penalty
Five to Life *
Five to Life *
Five to Life *
Five to Life *
Five to Life
*plus one to five
years gun enhancement
3. With your concurrence, I have discussed with prosecutor
William F. Daines,
the possibility of your entering
a plea of guilty to the charges as follows:

Present
Charge

Reduced to
or As Charged

Agg. Robbery
Robbery
Agg. Robbery
Robbery
Agg. Robbery
Robbery
Agg. Robbery
Robbery
Habitual Criminal Dismissed

Class or
Degree

Statutory Penalty

2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd

One
One
One
One

Degree
Degree
Degree
Degree

to
to
to
to

Fifteen
Tifteen
Fifteen
Fifteen

years
years
years
years

A. The prosecutor for the State of Utah has further
agreed that it is understood that the Defendant is reserving his
right to appeal the District Court Judge's decision wherein he
refused to dismiss the State's compalints upon Defendant's motion
that the State had failed to comply with provisions of the
interstate agreement on detainers act. Said Motion having corre
on for hearing before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on January 4,
1985. In addition, the prosecutor agrees to recommend credit for
the time Defendant has served in jail awaiting trial.
I, THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT
5. It is my decision to enter a plea of guilty to the
information now on file against me in the above entitled
court, a copy of which I have received, and that I am entering
a plea voluntarily and of my own free will after conferring
with my undersigned attorney.
6. Under the circumstances, as we have discussed them,
Judge Hyde's decision not to grant dismissal of the charges
based on the State's failure to comply with the interstate
agreement on detainers act, has left me in a position of severe
exposure of being convicted on the 1st degree felonies originally
charged against me. As a result of that decision, I agree with
you that we should work out a plea as above described.
7. I clearly understand that if I desired to go to
trial, that you would be happy to represent me and would do
everything legally and ethically possible to secure me
acquittal.
8. I advise the Court that I enter this plea with a
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
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O 5.

a. I know that I have a constitutional right under
the Constitution of Utah and of the United States, to plead
not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to*which I
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by the Court
should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right
to be represented by the undersigned attorney.

SS
Defendant's I n i t i a l s

dS2

b. I know that if I wish to have a trial in court
upon the charge, I have a right to be confronted by the
witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in
my presence and before the court and jury with the right to
have witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know
that I have a right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the
State at its expense to testify in -court upon my behalf and
that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in court on my
own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, the jury can
and will be told that this may not be held against me if I
choose to have the jury so instructed.
Defendant's Initials
c. I know that if I were to have a trial that the
State must prove each and every element of the crime charged
to the satisfaction of the court or jury beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that I would have no obligation to offer any
evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury,
whether it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a
unanimous of all jurors.
A
Defendant's Initials
d. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of
the United States, that I have a right against selfincrimination
(a right not to give evidence against myself), and that this
means that I cannot be compelled to testify #in Court at a
trial unless I choose to do so.

64
befendantfs Initials
^

e. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, thai if
I woro tried and convicted by -a jury or by-~t-he—Gousrt, that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to
the Supreme Court of Utah, for review of the trial proceedings,
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs of such
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without
cost to me, and to have the assistance of counsel on such
appeal.
Defendant's Initials

263^

'H~

f. I am entering a plea of guilty with the following
understanding of its effect of my consititutional rights as
set out in the five (5) preceding paragraphs. My plea is entered
not because I am guilty of the offenses charged against me,
but because I feel that under the circumstances it is in my
best interest to accept the plea bargin as negotiated btween
my attorney at the State, I know and understand that by
entering a plea of guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights
as set out in four (4) paragraphs above, a through d. However,
I am expressly reserving my right to appeal the Judge's decision
on my motion to dismiss, based on the State's failure to comply
with the provisions of the interstate agreement on detainer's
act.

¥>

Defendant's Initials
g. I know that under the laws of Utah, the possible
maximum sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of
guilty to the charge identified on page one of this agreement,
are set out in paragraph 3 above. I also know that if I am
on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have
pleaded guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
^
Defendant's Initials
h. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of
guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a
fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises
have been made by anyone as to what the sentence will be if
I plead guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my
guilty plea.
r

46
Defendant's Initials

i. No one has forced or threatened or coerced me
to make me plead guilty and I am doing so, of my own free
will, and after discussing it with ray attorney. I know that
any opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he
believes the court may do are not binding on the court. I
understand that neither the prosecutor nor ray attorney have
promised or made any assurance as to what sentence the judge
will eventually impose.

§
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or to

Defendant's I n i t i a l s
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j. No promise of any kind have been made to induce
me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do
j
plead guilty, the other charge pending against me will be
|
dismissed as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, I am also
i
aware that any charge or* sentencing concessions or recommendations
for probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction
!
of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either
!
defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on
I
the court and may not be approved and followed by the court.

5^
Defendant's Initials
k. I am not now under the influence of either
drugs or alcohol
Defendant's Initials
9. I have read this agreement, or I have had it read to
me by ray attorney, and I know and understand it contents. I
am\*>years of age, have attended school through j^grade, and
I can read and understand the English language. I have
discussed its contents with my attorney and ask the court to
accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth above in
this agreement.
DATED this \b

i
j

day February, 1985

DEFENDANT

A

or**-

expiation means to make satisfaction for, atone for, or to
appease.)
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for the above named
defendant, and I know they have read this agreement, or that
I have read it to them, and I discussed it with them and
believe they fully understand the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my
knowledge and belief, the statements, representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing agreement
are in all aspects accurate and true.

ORDER
The signature of the defendant was acknowledged in the
presence of the undersigned judge.
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Expiation
Agreement, the court finds the defendant's plea guilty is
freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's
plea of "guilty" to the charge set forth in the agreement be
accepted and entered.
DONE in Court this

_day of February, 1985,

JDDCT

APPENDIX 5
Sentences Imposed Upon Guilty Pleas

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

hsBER

# M f t 8 fc 111 IDF
COUNTY, STATEfW^'TAH

State of Utah,
COMMITMENT TO UTAhTSTATE
PRISON

vs.
STEVEN M. STILLINGS

No.

Defendant.

16269

—00O00Defendant having been convicted by [ ] a jury; [ 1 the court; ^ p l e a of guilty;
[ ] plea of no contest; of the offense of ROSLERY
> a
2nc
felony of the
* degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
1nlt?als

THE BASIC SENTENCE
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison;
- fa^ ^^xnot less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
C ] to pay fine in the amount of $
.
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
[ ] one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3);
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3);
[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above,
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison,
RESTITUTION
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

n

'• &

, to

Defendant is remanded into custody of:
^^x the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
[ ] the Warden for execution of this sentence.
nn-rm *u•
DATED
this

13th

HTEST:

Richard Greene

fr -^

J,

• ,^+i

V ^

-day
. of
* February7

, County Clerk
//

, Deputy Clerk

1n85

19

^

DISTRICT JUDGE
Q Q

WF R V P

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
State of Utah,
vs.

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
{
)

STEVEN M. STILLTVSS

.
Defendant.

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE

PRISON

)

No. 1 6 2 7 1

)
)

V

—00O00—

Defendant having been convicted by [ ] a jury; [ 1 the court acixbplea of guilty;
[ ] plea of no contest; of the offense of
ROBBERY
f a
felony of the ^ n d degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
initials
THE BASIC SENTENCE
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison;
[>3x not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $
.
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
[ ] one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3);
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3);
•[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison.

-£

RESTITUTION
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

Oil

, to

Defendant is remanded into custody of:
k i the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
[ ] the Warden for execution of this sentence.
DATED this

15th day of F e b r u a r y

ATTEST: Richard Greene

%County

Clerk

By - -N // 's<*. i / '~?. ' f

, Deputy Clerk

193J5

£

r7

DISTRICT JUDG£;

/)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

WEBER

State of Utah,
vs.
STEVEN M.

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, ANO
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE
PRISON

STILLINGS

No.

Defendant.

Ur

16272

—00O00—

Defendant having been convicted by [ ] a jury; [ 1 the court; ^Jfclea of guilty;
[ ] plea of no contest; of the offense of
PREPPY
> a
2n<
felony of the
3 degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
initials
THE BASIC SENTENCE
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison;
-Of
[>3x:tfot less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $
.
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
[ ] one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3);
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3);
[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison.
RESTITUTION
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
, to

?JL

Defendant is remanded into custody of:
[x}c the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
[ ] the Warden for execution of this sentence.

DATED this

^ 1 % of

Februar

y

19 8S _

^
/

Richard Greene

?C&u*'C/'/''/'{Js

TEST:

, County Clerk

- •'

* -*, H

's sf,

Deputy Clerk

£

J/!?*-< ^

DISTRICT JUDGE -

Q 4n

